Ei Di(gt) Vi = Pgt + Bgt Ei Di(gt+1) Vi - egt

Ei Di(gt) Vi = Pgt + Bgt Ei Di(gt+1) Vi - egt

Apparently that's the mathematical, undeniable proof football teams should elect to go for it more often on fourth and down. That's according to David Romer, an economics professor at Cal-Berkeley.

Here are Romer's findings, thanks to an espn.com column:

A team facing fourth-and-goal within five yards of the end zone is better off, on average, trying for a touchdown.

At midfield, on average, there is an argument to go for any fourth down within five yards of a first down.

Even on its own 10-yard-line -- 90 yards from the end zone -- a team within three yards of a first down is marginally better off, on average, going for it.

Alright, I'll give math its due. Knowing about probability and expected value are huge, if you're a poker player. I am. I even have a poker blog.
But poker and football are two seperate games. One is a form of gambling that can be almost entirely reduced down to math. The other is decided by 200-300-pound men in modern-day suits of armor.

Maybe Carolina head coach John Fox put it best:

"Statistical analysis like this doesn't interest more people because it's sterile. It's not real. It's a damn paper. Here's the thing: It's all matchups at the goal line. I don't think his stats and computers take matchups into account, am I right? It's not about stats and probability at the goal line, it's about yours against theirs. Guards on linebackers. Who's hurt? Do they cover your tight end? Who's playing well, who isn't? Are they the No. 1 run defense and we're the 31st-ranked run offense?

"There's no question the other thing that isn't factored in here is momentum. No question there's a huge emotional swing that you have to factor in. You move to the one and don't get in? Factor that in as far as momentum the rest of the game? A stat can't do that. There are just way more factors that go into this decision than just one equation. How's your offense playing? How's your defense playing? The score? Time remaining in the game? Should I throw that out the window and look at this stat? Let me tell you something, if we're up seven and I can kick a field goal to go up 10 – that means two scores, with two minutes left to play in the game – I don't give a crap on fourth-and-1 if I think I can get in the end zone or not – I'm kicking the dang field goal. See, I don't want to dismiss this paper. But I won't hold it up as gospel, either."

Amen brother.

I'm not just writing this because of the Bellman Equation (you know, those letters and symbols above). I also drew inspiration from Chuch Bower and Frank Frigo's "What would Zeus do?" In the New York - Dallas game, Zeus calls for the Ginats to go for a two-point conversion when they're down by one with 1:06 left in the game?

Why?

As best I can figure it, it's because Dallas was favored to win the game before the opening kickoff. At kickoff according to oddsmakers, the Cowboys had a 60 percent chance of winning. If New York ties it there, the Giants will still lose 60 percent of the time, according to the computer. So, their best chance at winning is to go for the two-point conversion, which apparently must work more than 40 percent of the time.

I've lost myself, and therein lies my point.

As much as football minds hate reporters second guessing them, it's gotta be worse coming from mathematicians. Right?

Another thing I can do without: the PROTRADE The Sports Stock Market sidebar on each ESPN.com gamer. I like how they point out game changing plays, but the before and after Win Probabilities are completely worthless.

If I understand this right, after the Ravens converted on third-and-six with 10 minutes to play against Kansas City while leading 13-3, the Chiefs were left praying for a three-outer or miracle runners after the flop.

This isn't poker.